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INTRODUCTION AND ABOUT THE PROJECT
What does governance look like ‘from below’ – from the perspectives of 
poor and marginalised households? How do patterns of conflict affect 
that? These were the questions at the heart of the Governance at the 
Margins research project.
Over three years from 2017-2020 we worked to explore this through 
in-depth study in conflict-affected areas of Mozambique, Myanmar1, and 
Pakistan. Our research teams interviewed the same people regularly over 
that time, finding out how they resolved problems and interacted with 
authorities. 
Here we connect what we found to the realities and complexities 
of development practice. We draw on the input of 20 experienced 
practitioners working in bilateral and multilateral development agencies 
and international NGOs, who generously gave their time to help us think 
through the practical implications of our wealth of findings. 
This document is organised around 5 key findings. After each finding 
there are some prompt questions for practice, and some practical 
responses to the finding suggested by practitioners. We don’t suggest one 
blueprint or uniform way of responding because we think it is crucial to 
recognise differences between contexts – particularly different intensities 
of conflict and violence and their drivers. Responses will look different in 
different contexts.   
In our discussions with practitioners a number of cross-cutting 
challenges and dilemmas emerged. A separate section explores these in 
more depth, raising some bigger questions.  
1  In Myanmar our research was conducted prior to the military coup that took place in February 2021, and 
references to government authorities are not to the subsequent military-led regime.
About the project
The first phase of our project, from 2017–2019, was entitled 
‘Governance Diaries’ after the innovative research approach we 
developed. By visiting and interviewing the same households 
approximately monthly over the course of 12 months we were 
able to identify the kinds of issues that came up for families, 
what actors they did or did not engage to help resolve them, and 
how far these issues were resolved. We included more than 160 
households in this phase, across the three countries.
In a second phase of the research, from 2019-2020, we focused 
in on findings from the first phase. We identified 80 key 
intermediaries in a number of the communities from the first 
phase – people who households in those communities told us 
were important in solving local governance problems – and used 
the same research method of visiting and interviewing them 
regularly over 12 months. We looked to see what kinds of issues 
they became involved with, what strategies they used to resolve 
them, and how they navigated multiple authorities and linked 
into the wider governance system. We also adapted the method 
to investigate the roles of intermediaries and community level 
problem-solving after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Governance at the Margins is part of the Action for 
Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA) research programme. 
You can find out more about A4EA here.
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Many programmes and policies over-assume the importance of the 
government as the primary authority in people’s lives, and don’t engage 
with the diversity of actors and institutions that are taking real decisions 
that affect people, or indeed the messy ways in which these can overlap. 
Whilst these other authorities are sometimes acknowledged and 
engaged with in grassroots development practice, they are too often 
disregarded or rendered invisible in programme and policy frameworks.  
The authority and legitimacy of a wide range of authorities outside of 
the community was a common finding across all our research locations. 
External authorities that we found to be important included national 
and sub-national governments, non-state administrations, armed 
actors, political parties, land holders, traditional assemblies and leaders, 
corporations and various public and private service providers. These may 
not have a formal mandate, but are seen by community members as 
holding responsibility for some public decisions, goods and services. Even 
when they form part of the state – as is the case with the military or sub-
national governments – they are often experienced as quite distinct from 
the central government administration.
With a variety of authorities present, there is often a choice of who to 
go to when a problem arises. Decisions on which authorities to approach 
are affected by a range of things. Authorities’ history of effectiveness 
and timeliness in resolving issues, how close or far away they are, as well 
as costs of going to see them and how they treat people are often the 
deciding factors, regardless of what they are responsible for officially. 









Multiple and diverse authorities matter for people’s decision-making and governance needs. These 
extend beyond the official government and are both formal and informal.
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Differing views on the legitimacy of different authorities also affect who 
people will engage with and on what. History, politics, conflict, and 
identity affect these perceptions of legitimacy.
Authorities often overlap, whether cooperating or actively competing 
with one another in the same areas and on the same issues. This is 
especially the case in Myanmar, where there are parallel authorities 
to the Myanmar government established by ethnic minority groups in 
many areas. In other places the overlaps come when different groups or 
organisations with influence decide on a more ad hoc basis who should 
get involved in particular issues, or compete to resolve problems to 
bolster their own standing. There are often clearly understood differences 
in what kinds of issues authorities are responsible for or are better at 
resolving. For example in some communities in Mozambique, mining 
companies are seen as having the authority to resolve certain specific 
issues. Who people see as a ‘duty-bearer’, relevant to solving a problem 
or accountable for taking action, doesn’t necessarily align with any formal 
government mandate or control over state resources.
Multiple authorities mattered in all of our research locations, both 
rural and urban, although who was important varied across different 
places within each country. Diverse authorities still mattered even where 
the state or formal authorities were very visible. In some of our urban 
research sites, there was more obvious state-led service provision but 
other authorities were also important. Sometimes this was because state 
services were inaccessible to the poor and marginalised for other reasons. 
Questions for practice
•  If we are not currently working with a diversity of informal actors, why is 
this? Have we decided that they aren’t relevant to the outcomes we’re 
seeking? Or are there barriers to working with them?
•  How do we identify and assess the local legitimacy of a diversity of 
formal and informal actors?
•  If the formal system is weak, is this because powerful actors have vested 
interests in keeping the state weak, or simply a consequence of conflict, 
context and history?
•  Considering the limited risk appetite amongst many donors and 
development actors, how in practice can we work with more ‘political’ 
actors such as parties, parallel authorities, and non-state actors? 
•  What role can we play in facilitating convergence or interaction between 
multiple authorities, and in what contexts? 
•  In what situations does it make more sense to support a plurality of 
authorities rather than trying to bring them together?
•  What are our implicit assumptions about what ‘good’ development 
looks like when it comes to the role of non-state and informal 
authorities, and should we be questioning these?
Examples from our research
•  In Myanmar community members in one village tract had engagements 
with not only the Myanmar government and the Myanmar military, 
but also with both the administrative and armed wings of five different 
ethnic administrations. These engagements included taxation, escalation 
of community issues, justice/conflict resolution, security, service delivery 
and receiving directives from above.  
•  In Pakistan households identified a range of authorities including local 
administrators, the military, police, various political parties, religious 
authorities, landlords, and panchayat (village council) members. 
In Myanmar community members of one village tract had 
engagement with not only the Myanmar government and 
the Myanmar military, but with both the administrative 
and armed wings of five different ethnic administrations. 
Engagement included taxation, escalation of community 
issues, justice/conflict resolution, security, service delivery and 
directives from above. 











Be explicit about ideological differences: Some of us see the primary 
aim of development work as building institutions and public services, and 
particularly the institutions of government and democratic governance 
processes. Others are more focused on community resilience, meeting 
immediate needs or cohesion. Being clear on our programme’s objectives 
and what we think success looks like, and articulating our underlying 
assumptions, can guide us in engaging with a diversity of authorities. 
Think through acceptable compromises: Some authorities viewed as 
legitimate from within the community may be viewed as ‘unsavoury’ 
or too political by development actors (e.g. armed groups, militaries, 
political parties, or some customary institutions). This is particularly likely 
to happen where national identity and the state is contested. Engaging 
with non-state authorities, including those that may challenge the state, 
requires complicated compromises and careful understanding of when 
there is an unacceptable risk that core principles might be undermined.
Challenge risk aversion: Creative solutions may be needed to navigate 
compliance and risk management requirements when these reduce 
our ability to engage with non-state authorities or particular kinds of 
actors with influential roles. Because this may require extra resources 
and increase risks for those implementing programmes on the ground, 
strong trusting relationships with donors along with high-quality risk 
monitoring are key – but this may be harder to secure where donors or 
other development actors are also prioritising their relationships with 
state authorities.
How can we respond to this?
Practitioners that we spoke to gave these ideas:
Assume a diversity of important authorities: Particularly in conflict-
affected contexts we need to reject the default assumption that state 
institutions are automatically in control, and instead start from the 
premise that there are diverse sources of authority, many of whom have 
local legitimacy, and that the state is simply one actor among others. 
Seek a deeper understanding of the diversity: Undertake ongoing 
analysis to understand the complexity of authorities and their roles on 
different issues. Who undertakes this analysis is critical, as local insights 
on various authorities can help us to move beyond looking at the already-
documented structures, roles and responsibilities. Being aware of 
multiple authorities is important for minimising harm, whether we end up 
working with them or not. 
Create solutions to circumnavigate compliance and risk 
requirements that reduce the ability to engage with non-
state authorities or particular kinds of influential roles. 
Strong trusting relationships with donors along with strong 
risk monitoring is key.
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Intermediaries were key to deciding whether problems experienced 
by individuals or communities should be escalated, to which authority 
and how. In most research locations, and particularly where conflict was 
more active, community members had very little, if any, choice in which 
intermediary they could go to. However, intermediaries could often 
choose which external authorities to approach and how these contacts 
were navigated. Different intermediaries also focused on different 
issues. In contexts experiencing active conflict, intermediaries were 
Many development programmes and policies assume that people can 
approach and connect with public services and officials themselves. 
We found it is more common that these contacts are mediated by key 
individuals. This challenges assumptions about how governance and 
services work in practice. The informal or unofficial nature of these roles, 
coupled with the fact that those playing them are sometimes unusual 
governance actors, means that despite practitioners often knowing how 
important they are, they are frequently missed out when programmes 
map what structures are in place and who is important.
In all our research locations intermediaries were essential to the functioning 
of local governance, serving as the ‘grease’ that oiled governance systems.  
There are many terms we could use for this role, but the best general term 
for their function is that they mediate. We mean this in two ways. First, they 
connect people to higher-level authorities and other decision-makers to get 
problems solved. They sometimes communicate high-level authorities’ rules 
to community members, and sometimes select who benefits from resources 
allocated by those authorities. Through these activities they mediate 
relationships between authorities and community members. Second, some 
intermediaries have decision-making and enforcement authority themselves, 
so they mediate within the community – resolving problems between 
people at that level, coordinating collective activities or providing services. 
Intermediaries’ behaviour and choices can amplify or confound other 










Intermediaries are crucial to how governance happens. They work as the ‘navigators’ of diverse 
sources of authority, work across formal and informal local governance systems, and in some cases 
exercise significant authority themselves as ‘deciders’. 
In South Sudan, we saw organically strong and legitimate groups 
of women becoming ‘formalised’ and lose their credibility once 
funded by an INGO – it very much changes dynamics when external 
actors come in. So we learnt from this and instead accompanied 
small informal groups, connected them with other networks, 
provided small seed funding and acted as a sounding board. CONTENTS 
PAGE
PRACTITIONER REFLECTION
often particularly focused on ensuring protection and security for the 
community – which could involve negotiating with parties to the conflict.
Intermediaries’ approaches and tactics varied across locations 
depending on the level of influence or control they had over local 
development issues. For example, in some locations Intermediaries 
played more of an overt public authority role, only escalating issues to 
higher level authorities when absolutely required. Others played a subtler 
‘advocate’ role or used less obvious and more covert tactics. This was 
particularly notable among women intermediaries, who would often 
leverage the position of their husband or son within the community or 
use their own connections to other women to influence decisions outside 
of formal channels.    
Some intermediaries spoke of undertaking their role as a duty or 
obligation to others, but many also had other incentives for accepting 
these positions. Their position as intermediaries often provided social 
status or supported their political ambitions. Particularly where their 
role was not otherwise renumerated, being an intermediary sometimes 
also provided financial reward through ‘fees’. These fees were framed 
as recovering the costs of their time or travel, rather than generating 
substantial income.
Intermediary roles are sometimes thought of in negative terms – as 
being predatory, supporting clientelism, or being liable to co-optation. 
In our research, however, we saw a more positive – or at least neutral – 
view from households. Intermediaries were generally seen by households 
as more trusted and able to deliver for communities than formal or more 












we studied often offered some very localised accountability – as they 
could be called on to explain their actions in order to sustain their 
position or to uphold norms about what the role entails. This more 
positive view might also be because we focused on the intermediaries 
who households had identified as important to them.
Intermediaries have different characteristics. Some are political party 
brokers. Some are community activists. Some are elected village leaders. 
Some are retired government officials. The intermediaries we studied 
all had close relationships to their local areas. Most often they were 
current or former community leaders, members or former members 
of community associations, other grassroots organisations, political 
parties or movements. They often held widely acknowledged ‘informal’ 
leadership and intermediation roles rather than official positions, 
although these distinctions generally didn’t matter to community 
members. They are often seen by those they ‘represent’ as having a 
legitimate right to act and take decisions on their behalf. What gave 
these individuals their legitimacy and importance was different in each 
location. Across our locations, in addition to community social norms, 
this related to individuals’ personality traits, abilities, histories, resources 
or connections. Representing a particular identity – whether ethnic, 
religious, or political – was also important.  
Questions for practice
•  If we’re choosing not to engage with informal intermediaries, why is 
this? Is it an oversight or are there barriers – for example, concerns 
around legitimacy or corruption? Or have we made a conscious choice 
to focus only on building the formal system? 
•  Does our analysis, particularly at the programme design stage, seek to 
identify and take into account these different kinds of intermediaries?
•  How do we challenge perceptions of intermediaries only as ‘gatekeepers’ 
that can give programmes access to communities, and instead engage 
with them as actors who exert public authority themselves? 
•  How can we work with these actors whilst also avoiding creating 
opportunities for elite capture or reinforcing any exclusionary practices?
•  How can we engage with intermediaries in a way that avoids 
undermining their legitimacy and the respect in which they are held by 
community members and/or public authorities?
Examples from our research
•  In Myanmar many intermediaries were village leaders. Within the 
Myanmar government their roles were not formally recognised, but 
within many communities they were viewed as having an official 
position and held significant power. In some communities they were 
elected, in others they were appointed or rotating. Village leaders 
engaged with other influential people within the community as well 
as a variety of external authorities, such as the Myanmar government 
and multiple ethnic administrations. Some issues will move between 
multiple authorities before they are resolved. 
•  In Mozambique there is a very structured and hierarchical decision-
making system of formal local governance, but intermediaries’ 
informal contacts were key in getting things done. This included some 
intermediaries with strong links and relationships with ruling party, and 
others whose position with a community association allowed them to 
bypass the official hierarchy.
•  In Pakistan brokers with good connections within the state and to 
service providers were particularly important, but so were groups that 
claimed to represent people and mobilised them to act collectively – 
such as social movements. In Islamabad, two intermediaries from a 
left-wing party working on housing rights for slum residents often dealt 
with the municipality on behalf of the residents. Whenever government 
officials came to demolish houses, residents called these intermediaries 
for help. When someone got sick or needed medical care, they also 












Influencing norms around intermediation. It is important to examine the 
social and governance norms that shape who has legitimacy to mediate 
for or within a community. We should consider working to influence 
norms and expectations around how intermediaries behave, involve 
people, report back to them and treat the most vulnerable. 
Recognise intermediaries as political actors. Understanding 
intermediaries’ political ambitions and incentives – as well as competition 
or division between intermediaries – presents opportunities for action 
and change, as well as for gaining a more holistic picture of the local 
political economy. Engaging with them is an important part of politically-
informed programming and policy. This often happens under the radar 
at point of delivery, instead of being more overt and deliberate – but a 
more overt approach does come with a trade-off in terms of the risk of 
perceived or actual politicisation of development work.  
How can we respond to this?
 Practitioners that we spoke to gave us these ideas:
 Engage with intermediaries as important actors without ‘projectising’ 
them. Recognising intermediaries’ roles and in some case supporting 
them doesn’t mean formalising a relationship or funding them 
directly. We should resist the temptation to ‘formalise’ or ‘projectise’ 
intermediaries, or to try to co-opt them into external agendas. One risk is 
undermining their community-level respect and legitimacy, and another 
is concentrating or condensing power in these roles. These risks can be 
monitored. 
Engage constructively with intermediaries’ authority. Concerns about 
intermediaries being predatory or ‘gatekeeping’ in non-inclusive ways 
may lead us to try to get around them, rather than engaging. But 
rethinking the role of these intermediaries and recognising them as 
important holders of public authority may open up possibilities to work 
with them, and indeed to challenge them to adopt more inclusive and less 
self-serving practices if necessary.
Understanding intermediaries’ political ambitions, incentives – 
and competition or division between intermediaries – presents 
opportunities for action and change, as well as giving a more 
holistic picture of the political economy. Engaging with them is an 
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Development programmes and policies too often assume that there is 
one system of governance or decision-making across wide territories. 
There is also often an assumption that a linear hierarchy through 
national, regional and local governance institutions means that policy 
is adopted and implemented in the same way across those territories. 
That isn’t how real local governance works in our research locations. 
Many practitioners are very aware of this, but end up working with 
frameworks that aren’t flexible or nuanced enough to respond to it.
Across the towns, villages and neighbourhoods where we worked we 
saw various sources of authority connected to one another in networks. 
Different actors became involved in different issues at different times and 
‘moved’ issues and decisions between members within their networks. 
These networks were made up of different combinations of multiple 
external authorities and local intermediaries. Networks of public authority 
were not limited to the kinds of people who are usually seen as governance 
actors; they also involved religious authorities, people in service provision 
roles such as doctors, and in some cases companies or private businesses 
(both legal and illegal). Organised collectives were also important parts 
of the web of public authority. Across all three locations, it was often 
individuals who were identified as important and trusted to act, rather than 
the institutions that they were part of or represented.  
The picture of which sources of authority mattered and how they were 
connected looked very different in each of our research sites. How 









Communities are governed through diverse local networks. ‘Standard’ local governance structures 
rarely apply, and there can be a lot of variation even within one region. 
We can find good arguments to convince donors that iterative 
analysis is not necessarily costly. We have designed it into our 
regular programme monitoring. By doing this we can anticipate 
issues and put measures in place earlier when things change… 
these are good selling points.




who was involved, over what issues, and how – all these aspects varied 
significantly. Factors driving this diversity included:  
• the presence of structures with different historical or customary origins; 
• the level of active violent conflict; 
• the level of political competition; 
• the extent of parallel governance systems; 
• the presence or threat of armed groups; 
• the geographical location (including proximity to powerful authorities); 
and
• the dynamics of centre-local relationships with the formal government. 
 
Whilst the relative importance of various higher-level authorities varied 
across contexts within one country, so too did the specific authorities 
within a network. In some locations, political party members or former 
local leaders were very powerful, whereas in other locations they were 
less so. Religious leaders and more formalised civil society groups 
were highlighted as part of some networks and were powerful in some 
locations. However, in general, they were not as prominent in local 
governance as some development narratives suggest. Other public sector 
or service delivery actors to whom development programmes rarely pay 
much attention, such as doctors, teachers, midwives or judges, featured 
as important actors within some of the networks.
Interactions within and across these networks relied on people using 
their existing familial, social and political capital, which has significant 
implications for inclusion and exclusion. As social capital is often 
connected with material wealth or education, these networks provide 
some people with more access to authorities than others – privileging 
local elites, and marginalising other groups. Arguably, more formalised 
institutional structures can compensate for a lack of social capital by 
guaranteeing all citizens’ rights of access. However, in their absence 
accountability for decisions that include some people and exclude others 
is shaped by social norms and cultural expectations. These networks have 
the potential to exacerbate inequalities in social capital, meaning that 
people who are already doing well continue improving their lives but 
those without the necessary social connections have no-one to approach 
for help.
Governance networks and experiences were different in urban and 
rural locations, but for different reasons across countries. The variation 
was driven by where political power was concentrated. In Mozambique 
the existence of political competition between Frelimo and other 
political parties in some urban areas meant that we found more 
contestation and multiple party-linked networks in these areas, whereas 
in the rural areas Frelimo tended to dominate all networks. In Pakistan 
the dominance of landlords and the military as core power-holders in 
the rural locations we worked in make a difference to the networks. 
In some urban parts of Myanmar physical proximity to government 
offices and relatively low levels of contestation of the state’s authority 
influenced the shape of the networks. 
In a project in Pakistan, we undertook in depth Political 
Economy Analysis and regular power analysis. Communities then 
did their own analysis (‘power change analysis’) which was also 
an empowerment tool. We also used the Reality Check 
Approach. Without this granular analysis, it would have been 
hard to do anything.













•  Do existing practices and standards for programmes’ analytical work, 
particularly at the design stage, emphasise identifying networks, 
intermediaries and authorities from the perspective of the people whom 
the programme is seeking to reach? 
•  Do we over-generalise in assuming the importance of some actors in 
governance networks, such as formal CSOs? If so, does this make us less 
likely to look for other actors who may be equally important?
•  What kinds of analysis would tell us about the crucial variations across 
local governance and community problem-solving, understanding these 
network dynamics and identifying where informal power lies? How do 
we find people who can meaningfully undertake this kind of analysis, 
and keep it up-to-date?
•  How can programmes combine a sufficiently uniform design across 
locations with recognising that these locations may have very different 
decision-making and power structures?
•  Does the variance in local governance networks mean that we tend to 
focus programming in certain areas or emphasise working with specific 
authority systems where there is more regularity? 
FINDING 3: DIVERSE LOCAL NETWORKS
Conflict analysis has to be prioritized but power analysis is really 
helpful to go deep in these power relations. We find tools mapping 











Examples from our research
•  In Islamabad, the proximity of informal settlements to government 
departments means that different kinds of access are possible and 
important. For example people who work in government offices as 
cleaners have been able to build connections that allow them to raise 
problems or find out who can help with a problem. 
•  In parts of Myanmar, village committees make these networks more 
visible. In some locations in Kachin state, these committees consist 
of a ward/village administrator (head of committee), a secretary 
and/or associate secretary, and in some cases youth and women 
representatives. Parallel to this, a ward level ‘traditional committee’ 
addresses issues using customary law. Elsewhere, however, these 
committees do not exist, with village administrators having more 
concentrated power while other influential individuals within the village, 
are drawn on for specific issues. 
Balance insider and outsider perspectives. The best analysis will come 
from combining different perspectives. Particularly where ethnic, tribal, 
political or religious divisions are strong, many people will have implicit 
assumptions about the ‘way things work’ in different places. Including the  
knowledge, intuition and insights from those in the locality/community 
alongside information from other places in the country or beyond can 
surface tacit assumptions on both parts, help with unearthing hidden 
power dynamics, and challenge received wisdom.  
Design for adaption. Having a programme design that is flexible enough 
to respond to ongoing analysis is key to ensuring that our activities are 
responsive to change. This is often a challenge when detailed programme 
designs are required in advance. Building a programme that focuses on 
overall principles and approaches – for example articulating the different 
types of duty-bearer we want to engage with rather than explicitly 
naming specific authorities – can allow the flexibility to adapt approaches 
and expand the range of actors we work with when things change on the 
ground.   
Design in variation. The aim should be to shift our focus away from 
uniform activities, and more towards overall principles that can work 
within a variety of local governance networks. The challenge of managing 
a wide variety of interventions to address micro-level variations in 
governance environments can be mitigated by grouping project locations 
into a smaller number of ‘types’ that require a particular kind of 
approach. 
How can we respond to this?
Practitioners that we spoke to gave these ideas:
Analyse local governance realities carefully. Relations between 
individuals and public authorities within these networks are influenced 
by complex and evolving power dynamics. Analysis must be grounded in 
people’s own understandings of legitimacy and authority from within a 
given community, and nuanced enough to identify and map who people 
really go to for help. If necessary this may mean challenging biases 
towards ‘the usual actors’ and formal or official organisations and figures, 
including CSOs or religious leaders.
Ensure that analytical tools are fit for purpose. We need to look at 
existing analysis tools and critically reflect on whether they are mapping 
the networks in the way we need. Embedding ethnographic or social 
network approaches within our analysis may help to surface different 
connections across the network – for example family and business links. 
This information may already exist outside of our programmes in existing 
research.
Integrate regular analysis. Power and influence within networks can 
change quite dramatically over time. Building analysis into existing systems 
and processes, as an ongoing component of a programme or policy, is a way 
of ensuring that our understanding of these remains accurate. This can be a 
formally structured part of the monitoring, evaluation and learning system, 
or as light-touch as having informal chats with the same people every few 
months, which helps to build up trust. Once trust exists, these check-in 
points may be enough to ensure that programmes’ assumptions about local 
governance remain valid.  
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These low expectations combine with other incentives to avoid 
approaching higher authorities or using official channels. Doing so can 
be costly – both in time and in ‘fees’. It can require social capital, language 
skills, or ways of behaving that are unfamiliar. It can also be seen as an 
escalation that sends a signal that communities are not able to resolve 
their own issues, with going outside of local channels being seen as 
‘airing dirty laundry’ or embarrassing the community, especially when the 
community is already marginalised and facing negative stereotypes. This 
is also gendered – women taking their issues outside of the community 
can be seen as them ‘exposing’ themselves or sharing information that 
should be kept private. 
Previous negative experiences of seeking an official solution also 
mattered – either direct experience, or common narratives. Sometimes 
multiple competing authorities mean that deciding to approach or 
not to approach any given authority is a significant political move, and 
one which may have negative ramifications within a conflict-affected 
setting. Attempts by higher authorities to deter people from escalating 
their concerns are also common, and may include pushing officials or 
intermediaries to attempt local solutions first.
Assuming a preference for state-run or centrally managed services and 
decision-making may not be in keeping with community views and 
practices and may be premised on a demand for service provision that 
doesn’t exist at a local level. This has a range of implications for public 
policy and development programmes.
Across our locations, people, and many of the intermediaries to 
whom they turned, did not expect much from the wider governance 
system. Higher level authorities were often parties to conflict or seen as 
aggressors. Historic under-provision of services and limited experience of 
solutions actually being provided by those authorities were often coupled 
with a sense that authorities were implicated in causing the problems 
in the first place. Sometimes the physical distance from where offices 
and officials are located is a factor. Distrust of authorities, and political 
and social divides (including on identity lines) also play a role. In some 
situations, low expectations of a particular authority are due to political 
views about who the most legitimate duty-bearer is. Low expectations 
result in fewer demands being made of higher authorities. 









Self-provision and low expectations are common. People (including intermediaries) are 




FINDING 4: SELF-PROVISION AND LOW EXPECTATIONS
As a result, what we term ‘self-provision’ is widespread. By self-
provision we mean situations where solutions are found without 
involving higher-level authorities or official duty-bearers. 
• Sometimes this involves intermediaries or other informal sources of 
authority making decisions or taking steps to secure local provision of 
services such as electricity generation or water supply. 
• Sometimes it involves intermediaries intervening between parties and 
coming to a decision, which is then respected by those involved. 
• Sometimes it simply involves people negotiating with each other to 
resolve a problem that could have gone to a more formal or institutional 
resolution process. 
 In the more extreme cases, communities or intermediaries establish 
their own local rules, resolutions, and punishments. Community support 
for these kinds of self-provision solutions is sometimes linked to what is 
seen as a culturally appropriate and ‘just’ outcome, regardless of broader 
policy or legislation.
This doesn’t necessarily mean that people see self-provision as the best 
solution; sometimes it is considered the least-worst result based on 
previous experience and political dynamics, or acknowledged as purely 
a strategy for survival. In Pakistan, for example, many people involved in 
our research felt that powerful local elites benefit more than poorer and 
marginalised households from self-provision, yet they feel ‘locked in’ to 
this system and have few alternatives. 
In one location, people from local communities formed 
‘solidarity’ networks to help manage influx of displaced people. 
Our organisation brought additional support to the community 
focusing on access to basic services. Tensions arose between our 
work and what the solidarity network was doing. So we shifted our 
approach, so that community members could input into criteria 
and be transparent. We involved intermediaries, listened directly 
to people, and kept our ears on the ground. This looked very 
different from the original service delivery approach. It took time 
but was more legitimate as we were really listening. We saw micro 
issues as indicative of systemic issues and integrated learning to 












FINDING 4: SELF-PROVISION AND LOW EXPECTATIONS
Examples from our research
•  People in the informal settlements of Islamabad mostly prefer to solve 
disputes locally, rather than involving the police. Their preference is 
based on their historical experience with law enforcement agencies and 
police brutality. For example, one of the intermediaries we followed was 
approached to resolve an assault linked to domestic abuse. The family 
members of those involved approached him rather than going to the 
police station and registering a criminal case.
•  In Myanmar explicit ‘village rules’ were commonly developed and 
applied. Village rules range from banning alcohol on full moon days 
to not letting animals wander recklessly, to night-time curfews (often 
applied due to the likelihood of soldiers coming into the village in the 
evening). Breaking these rules incur community sanctions – generally 
agreed-upon fines or punishments involving public shaming, such as 
being tied to a tree in public all day.
•  In one urban neighbourhood in Mozambique, ‘community police’ 
formed by groups of residents were locally recognised as having the 
right to solve problems of criminality, including issuing punishment. This 
was tolerated by the authorities – though there was an insistence that 
they had a duty to inform the police about what was happening in the 
neighbourhood.
Questions for practice
•  If we support local solutions that meet people’s needs directly, how 
do we balance this with rights-based approaches that focus on holding 
higher level authorities – which may be weak – to account? 
•  What are the ways of supporting local solutions rather than replacing 
them, and what are the risks in doing this? 
•  What are the implications for women in particular of local resolution 
systems and ‘customary law’ – are their rights infringed or are they 











FINDING 4: SELF-PROVISION AND LOW EXPECTATIONS
How can we respond to this?
Practitioners that we spoke to gave these ideas:
Identifying where self-reliance is a necessity. In some situations, self-
provision has developed due to unresponsive or predatory authorities, or 
in response to immediate needs. Where this is the case, self-reliance may 
reflect fear and/or be a question of survival and resilience. Identifying and 
working with communities to strengthen internal accountability within 
these local provision systems may be more appropriate than encouraging 
engagement with external authorities. 
Understand expectations and preferences. Programmes may sometimes 
set out to encourage a demand for external service provision that doesn’t 
exist at a local level. Identifying what issues there is a desire to resolve 
or what services are needed and already delivered at what level is the 
key, especially where conflict makes authorities less trusted or reliable. 
Strengthening accountability within a community may be combined with 
social accountability approaches to build trust with authorities over time, 
enabling programmes to respond better to community preferences.  
Assess if self-provision is incentivised from above. In some contexts 
governments and other authorities might be perpetuating low 
expectations, self-reliance and self-provision to avoid accountability and 
demand for services. Supporting self-provision in these cases potentially 
lets duty-bearers off the hook. Programmes’ responses to these drivers 
should be quite different from cases where self-provision is driven by 
conflict, fear or rejection of external authorities.
See self-provision as an asset. Self-provision initiatives can provide 
opportunities that can be built on. Some local initiatives around self-
provision may strengthen local solidarity networks and ‘social capital’, 
bringing together groups that may not have been connected before. 
They may also help to form group identities and support other forms of 
collective action and mobilisation. Shifting from self-provision to collective 
claim-making will depend on context, as well as on the levels of division 
that exist within the community. These claims might be channelled 
towards external authorities when conditions change for the better, for 
example when the level of violent conflict reduces. 
Recognise risks of displacing existing solutions. When new policies, 
services, or structures are established there is a risk that they may 
‘squeeze out’ informal strategies of community protection and resilience 
that may have been working for many people, potentially providing a 
more reliable safety-net than new and often competing initiatives can 
develop in the short-term. Being conscious of these existing strategies is 
critical in minimising harm.
Be alert to inequalities or injustice sustained by self-provision. 
Recognising self-provision as a common solution and in some cases 
as people’s preference shouldn’t blind us to who wins and loses from 
these systems. In some places women in particular may experience 
worse outcomes, for example through highly patriarchal ‘customary 
justice’ institutions. Other people may also be relatively disadvantaged 
compared to the rights they have in formal systems. Gender-sensitive 
analysis is crucial, as is engaging with women’s rights groups to agree joint 
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All three of our contexts have highly patriarchal social norms. Women 
reported needing to go through men for all kinds of services or to get 
issues resolved, including at a household level through male family 
members, as well as through mostly male intermediaries beyond the 
household level. Although we actively sought out female intermediaries 
to include in our research, the majority of those that were identified by 
households as important in resolving community issues were men. 
In the three countries norms around women’s leadership in formal 
spaces were different, but in general women holding official positions 
or being the ‘go to’ intermediary challenged established norms. In 
some cases when they did play these roles their authority or breadth 
of responsibility was challenged and undermined by men. For example, 
in Mozambique there has been a push for the ruling party to be seen 
to include women in governance roles, but we found that once in these 
roles women were often side-lined or not given actual authority to make 
decisions.
In cases where women did play important roles as intermediaries, this 
was sometimes limited to issues that were seen as concerned more with 
women’s than men’s ‘domains’. Examples of these are domestic disputes, 
sexual violence, access to health services and child welfare. Some of our 
intermediaries worked on these issues, often quite visibly in parallel to 
male intermediaries, seeing their role as being a voice for women and to 
make sure other women were treated fairly. 
The fact that women very often need to engage with or rely on men 
who hold greater power within both formal and informal governance 
structures is not particularly surprising. However, it is important to 
recognise explicitly if public policy or development programmes expect 
women to be able to access services or entitlements unaided or on an 
equal basis to men.









Women typically need to engage with local patriarchal power structures. Despite this, women 
intermediaries are frequently viewed as successful. 
In supporting women’s leadership in community roles we try to 
take a ‘Women Lead’ approach where they drive the agenda, 
assess and identify needs and solutions. This approach means 
we have less control in identifying outcomes up-front for donors. 
Instead we focus on the value of the process and on building the 
evidence that this approach results in practical outcomes that are 




Women intermediaries also used gender norms to their advantage at 
times, and were often seen as more appropriate leaders than men. In 
Myanmar women have historically taken up some village leadership roles 
during periods of conflict, because they are perceived to be braver and 
more reliable than men, but also because cultural taboos over harming 
women were seen to protect them more from armed groups. Similarly, 
one of the female intermediaries in Pakistan mobilised other women to 
protest specifically because they would not be physically attacked by men 
in public. 
Some other women were able to play wider intermediary roles, beyond 
these issues. Often in fact they were regarded as more successful than 
men in these roles, and widely respected for that. On the one hand, 
the ‘barriers to entry’ for women to these roles appear higher; in almost 
every case they were able to establish themselves as intermediaries 
because they had special characteristics associated with their family, 
status and class or a personal history of determination and campaigning 
to resolve issues. On the other hand, women intermediaries have a wider 
reach within populations, as they do not face the barriers that male 
intermediaries do in dealing with women as well as men. 
Women intermediaries were sometimes able to mobilise others – both 
women and men – to protest or take collective action. For example 
women intermediaries played a leading role in Mozambique in blocking 
a road in protest at development issues, and in Pakistan in staging 
an occupation of disputed land. However we also found that when 
women played intermediary roles, they often drew on more indirect 
strategies in order to navigate a patriarchal environment. For example 
in Pakistan women’s exclusion from decision-making meant that women 
intermediaries sometimes relied on males within the household as their 
proxies. In Myanmar, some women intermediaries drew on the protection 
and status that derived from their association with powerful men. 
FINDING 5: LOCAL PATRIARCHAL POWER STRUCTURES
Our organisation actively supports informal female roles as an 
entry point for facilitating their access to formal roles (if this is what 













•  How can we support women intermediaries where they do exist?
•  How do we identify and try to break down the barriers to entry that face 
women seeking to exercise this kind of leadership?
•  How do we work out whether to support alternative roles – such as 
informal ‘female’ roles operating alongside the ‘male’ system – rather 
than getting women into the main intermediary roles?
•  To what extent should we seek to include the existing leadership, which 
is often male dominated, rather than creating space for new forms of 
leadership to emerge? 
FINDING 5: LOCAL PATRIARCHAL POWER STRUCTURES
Examples from our research
•  In some locations in Myanmar, Women leaders and groups were 
important, and had parallel structures. These, for example, brought 
cases of sexual assault to the attention of authorities, or were used 
to ensure a woman from the group was present when other decision-
making bodies were making judgements in cases involving women.
•  In Mozambique a husband and wife team led the residents’ association 
that was competing with a Frelimo-linked group to represent one local 
community and resolve issues resulting from displacement by a mining 
company. Whilst the woman was regarded as the leader, and relied 
on her own personal and political connections to get things done, her 
role was not official, and her husband was the one who was named as 
director of the association.
•  In Pakistan, one particularly effective female intermediary in a rural 
location was known to have deep connections with informal and formal 
authorities and to be able to get problems solved – although she often 
had to send her son to represent her in decision-making spaces that are 
customarily reserved for men.
•  In the case of a group of children trafficked to China from a border town 
in Myanmar, their parents informed a Kachin woman intermediary who 
is also the wife of a leader in the ethnic armed group. This intermediary 
is well respected and speaks Chinese; rather than going to the ethnic 
administration, she secured the return of most of the children by using 











Using positive examples: Negative perceptions about women leaders 
can be effectively challenged with examples of women’s leadership from 
within a community, or from very similar communities. Women holding 
positions of authority (including in extreme circumstances) are often 
viewed as being quite successful in these positions. Highlighting these 
positive examples is a good way to challenge patriarchal norms and 
attitudes. 
Think creatively about overcoming elite bias. We should accept that in 
some contexts women who can take on leadership and intermediary roles 
will tend to come from privileged backgrounds or have more access to 
assets and resources through their families. Whilst we might prefer to see 
women from more diverse backgrounds in these roles, supporting those 
who already have recognition may provide a path for others in the future. 
We can also work with more privileged women leaders on broadening 
their approaches to inclusion and supporting others. 
FINDING 5: LOCAL PATRIARCHAL POWER STRUCTURES
How can we respond to this?
Practitioners that we spoke to gave these ideas:
Identify women leaders. Policy and programme analysis should focus 
specifically on identifying who women rely on and trust to raise their 
issues. Women intermediaries may not be widely recognised as leaders 
and may not have the same titles or roles as male leaders within a 
community. Particular efforts should go into identifying informal women 
leaders and understanding the power dynamics surrounding them. 
Support women’s informal leadership positions: The characteristics 
that are associated with intermediaries or other authorities, and the 
associated public recognition and reputation as a leader, can often be 
gained through more informal roles. Actively supporting informal roles 
that women take up as representatives or through cooperatives or unions 
can be a useful entry point to develop potential for exercising future 
leadership in other roles. This also provides more representation for 
women within communities, and might provide some counterbalancing 











UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE FROM THE MARGINS 













In our discussions with practitioners a number of cross-cutting challenges and dilemmas emerged. 
We tackle six of these here.
Our research also suggests that parallel systems might not end up being 
very different in terms of power dynamics. Focusing on new systems 
might also miss opportunities to make existing ones more inclusive. 
One ‘middle way’ suggested was to engage with existing informal actors 
on moving towards more inclusive behaviours, which could provide an 
opportunity to strengthen local accountability. Associated with this is 
the risk that supporting localised solutions to specific issues undermines 
rights or lets external duty-bearers off the hook, particularly where higher 
level authorities have a formal responsibility to act. 
What does this complexity of governance actors 
and systems mean for where we focus our efforts?
Our findings show how complex and intricate decision-making can be at 
a community level, in particular in places where there is a backdrop of 
conflict and a history of under-provision. It is not only that processes are 
complex, however, but also that the underlying politics is complex. Policy 
and programme actions might not result in what was intended, informal 
or unexpected decision-makers might appear in the way, and our actions 
may alter the politics in unpredictable ways. 
Do we work ‘with the grain’ or challenge it – and 
at what costs for rights-based principles?
A common school of thought is that policies and programmes should 
‘work with the grain’ and engage with ways that things are already done 
and with prevailing power structures in particular contexts or locations. 
In some ways this is a natural conclusion of our research findings on the 
depth and importance of these practices and institutions. 
The quickest way to achieve things, and with a form of localised legitimacy, 
might be supporting established practices. However, we have shared a 
number of negative or potentially discriminatory aspects of these local 
governance practices, and working through existing power structures 
might solidify them or even undermine some core policy-making and 
programming principles. For example, the unequal access that women 
had to services and decision-making, or more predatory forms of 
intermediation identified, could be exacerbated by ‘working with the grain’. 
An alternative approach practitioners saw was to develop parallel 
systems that are more inclusive, or to invest in new forms of leadership 
and community representation to emerge – thereby attempting to 
disrupt established (and patriarchal) power structures. Although 
potentially more transformative over time, this is probably less likely 
to solve immediate problems. 
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One response to this might be to side-step the complexity and instead 
focus efforts on more standardised, formal or predictable parts of the 
governance or service delivery system. Some practitioners suggested 
that they had already seen this happening in practice, as programmes 
responded to recommendations to work on issues with the greatest 
chances of success and traction, and the fewest obstacles to achieving 
change. 
However, the problem of how policies made at a higher level are actually 
experienced by people on the ground remains, as these complex local 
systems will continue to shape who gets access to what, when and how. 
The same issue could apply to decisions not to work in conflict-affected 
or more fragile settings, which of course raises important issues of equity 
and exclusion.
Working out which issues are best dealt with at a community level rather 
than through engagement with a higher authority is challenging. Some 
practitioners noted that engaging with the granularity of local governance 
practices and actors can be a distraction from larger problems of public 
service delivery, and that there may be a risk of romanticising what can be 
achieved at a local level. For some issues, working directly on higher-level 
structural determinants might be required. Our findings suggest that this 
should not necessarily be a binary choice. 
How do we weigh up the risks around engaging 
in politics?
Key to these findings is the inherently political nature of the authorities, 
the intermediaries and the networks through which they interact. 
Politics presents a challenge to many development actors, who are 
explicitly committed to staying apolitical. Existing approaches have often 
been carefully crafted to avoid politicising the work, which leads to 
programmes engaging largely with state officials or civil society actors 
who are divorced from local politics. Some of our respondents suggested 
that on the ground, many implementing staff incorporated working with 
the local politics into their practice, even if they then down-played this in 
formal reporting. 
To create meaningful change we need to recognise the separation of 
development work from politics as artificial, and engage more with local 
politics. Doing so would enable us to bring back into our thinking the 
political ambitions, the incentives and the potential divisions amongst 
different actors – which may offer opportunities, as well as giving us a 
more holistic picture of the political economy we are working within. 
But this does come with a trade-off around levels of risk. There are risks 
associated with both perceived or real politicisation of organisations and 
development work. Many organisations and donors have a low level of 
tolerance for engaging with political entities due to these risks as well the 
need to sustain the impartiality which is often required to be effective in 
other areas such as humanitarian or bilateral government engagement. 
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4  What does this mean for working at scale?  
Concepts of working to scale and value for money are becoming increasingly 
important as development funding decreases. The diversity of local 
practices and actors that we found clearly challenges the assumption 
that we can pilot an approach in one locality and then simply ‘scale it up’. 
Instead, identifying the diversity of local governance networks suggests that 
smaller-scale and more contextually-tailored approaches should be applied.
Questioning how we view scale may help us overcome these challenges. 
Starting from localised analysis and interventions in multiple locations, we 
can identify commonalities and trends across these localities. This will allow 
us to focus on issues or solutions that are common to multiple localities and 
can be addressed at higher levels through issue-based projects. This would 
also enable issue-based projects working at national or provincial levels to 
be informed by different ways of working at a local level. 
Supporting plurality or strengthening 
convergence?
A diversity of authorities can lead to better outcomes for community 
members where it provides a degree of choice, or perhaps competition 
between actors. But diversity can also create confusion and reduce the 
scope for accountability that comes from having a clear duty-bearer. 
6
There is a spectrum of options to respond to this challenge – from 
supporting convergence between multiple authorities as a way to simplify 
a governance system, to supporting strategies that allow a multiplicity 
of actors to coexist and interact, to focusing on linkages between formal 
and informal systems. It is important to consider the trade-offs in each 
situation before deciding at which point along this spectrum a policy or 
programme will focus its efforts. Since this is a central dilemma faced by 
many peacebuilding actors, looking at the pros and cons identified by 
work within this field could be helpful. 
Who benefits from the status quo? 
A key consideration to help support decisions on how to respond to 
these findings is a deep understanding of who benefits from maintaining 
the status quo. Powerful actors such as companies, militaries, criminal 
organisations or even intermediaries themselves may have vested 
interests in keeping the formal system weak. Supporting informal 
solutions may be perpetuating their power. In other situations, the status 
quo may be a consequence of conflict, history or other political legacies.  
Better understanding of the reasons why the formal system is weak will 
help locate our work in broader historic, political and social ecosystems. 
The answer to this question can help guide decisions on how to engage 
and what systems we want to strengthen. 
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